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1.  The Distributivity Problem and the Cut-off Problem 
 
In  this  paper  we  propose  a  unified  semantics  for  singular  and  plural 
superlative expressions that makes use of the ‘**’ (“double star”) distributivity 
operator  (an  operator  whose  role  is  to  pluralize  2-place  predicates).  The 
analysis aims to solve two problems: (a) the distributivity problem (the fact 
that a superlative expression doesn’t distribute over the atomic parts of the 
plural individual it is predicated of); and (b) the cut-off problem (the fact that 
a plural superlative expression cannot simultaneously be predicated of two 
distinct  yet  overlapping  plural  individuals).  We  argue  that  any  solution  to 
these  problems  that  posits  two  distinct  superlative  morphemes,  one 
corresponding  to  a  superlative  operator  for  singular  individuals  and  one 
corresponding to a superlative operator for plural individuals, is challenged by 
the  lack  of  cross-linguistic  morphological  evidence.  We  provide  a  unified 
analysis,  and  account  for  the  differences  between  plural  and  singular 
superlative expressions by appealing to pragmatic principles. 
 
1.1.  The Main Empirical Observations 
 
The distributivity problem and the cut-off problem of plural superlatives are 
identified in Stateva (2005), where the empirical observations in (2) are made 
regarding the sentence in (1), which contains a plural superlative expression 
(tallest students). 
 
(1)  John and Bill are the tallest students. 
 
(2)  a.  Observation 1: the truth of (1) entails that the property in (i) holds 
of both John and Bill, but crucially not that the property in (ii) 
holds of each of them, and not even of one of them. 
 
    (i)  [ x:  x is a singular individual . the tallness of x exceeds the 
tallness of every student except John and Bill] 
    (ii) [ x: x is a singular individual . the tallness of x exceeds the 
tallness of every student except x]  
  
                                                 
 For very helpful comments we thank the audiences of the Linguistics Colloquium at Bar-
Ilan University (Ramat-Gan, Israel, 2007), SALT18 (UMass Amherst, 2008), The Conference 
on Language and Use (Paris, 2008), and the participants of the seminar on the morphology 
and semantics of degree constructions held at UCONN in Spring 2008. Special thanks go to 
Toshiko Oda for discussion of the Japanese data. All remaining errors are ours. 
 
 
              © 2008 by Natalia Fitzgibbons, Yael Sharvit and Jon Gajewski.  
T. Friedman and S. Ito (eds.), SALT XVIII, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.    
  b.  Observation 2: If (1) is true, then ‘X are the tallest students’ may 
also be true (where X corresponds to a proper subset or a proper 
superset of {John, Bill}). 
 
If Observation 1 were not true, and (1) also entailed that [ x. the tallness of x 
exceeds the tallness of every student except x] holds individually of John and 
of Bill, we would get a contradiction, namely, that John and Bill are taller than 
each other (‘John’s tallness exceeds the tallness of every student except John 
and Bill’s tallness exceeds the tallness of every student except Bill’). 
Observation 2 implies that in a context where (1) holds and Bill is 
taller than Mary who is taller than Sue (and all the other students are shorter 
than these four), both (3) and (4) are true. 
 
(3)  John, Bill and Mary are the tallest students. 
 
(4)  John, Bill, Mary and Sue are the tallest students. 
 
    While we agree that Observation 1 holds, we think Observation 2 does 
not. The reason for this has to do with discourses such as (5) and (6). 
 
(5)  A:  Who are the best students, John and Bill? Or John, Bill and Fred? 
B:  I would say John and Bill. It’s true that no student is better than 
Fred  but  worse  than  Bill  and  John,  but  c’mon!  Fred  has  a  D 
average! 
 
(6)    A:  John and Bill are the tallest students. 
     B:  You are forgetting Fred; he is only half an inch shorter than Bill. 
       A:  My mistake. John, Bill and Fred are the tallest students. 
 
In (5), A doesn’t know which of the two propositions (‘John and Bill are the 
best students’, ‘John, Bill and Fred are the best students’) is true, although he 
believes one of them is. B’s reaction suggests that he believes in the truth of 
the former but not the latter. In (6), B corrects A, and A accepts the correction 
(and admits that he was wrong in believing that ‘John and Bill are the tallest 
students’ is true, and accepts the truth of ‘John, Bill and Fred are the tallest 
students’). Both cases are at odds with Observation 2. 
The  well-formedness  of  these  discourses  suggests  that  the  context 
supplies a natural cut-off point on the relevant scale which determines, for a 
given gradable predicate R, a unique group of R-est individuals (see Herdan 
2008). Determining the value of the cut-off point is a complicated matter (see 
Scontras 2008) and depends on various kinds of contextual information (some 
of which are supplied by the comparison class itself). The cut-off point is 
sometimes known, but sometimes the speaker or hearer assumes that there is a 
unique cut-off point without knowing its value (in which case it can be said to 
be  bound  by  a  context-level  existential  operator).  Like  other  contextual 
parameters, the cut-off point may be reset as speakers become more informed. 
We therefore offer Observation 2’ instead. 
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(7)  Observation 2’: If (1) is true in context C, then a. may be true and b. 
may be true in context C, but no other sentence which follows the 
schema in c. is true in context C.  
 
a.  John is the tallest student. 
 
b.  Bill is the tallest student. 
 
c.  [X is/are the tallest student(s)] 
 
  Observations 1 and 2’ characterize the individual reading of (1). The 
sentence may also have a group reading. On that reading, a degree of tallness 
is determined for every relevant group (including the group that consists of 
John and Bill) which doesn’t necessarily equal the degree of tallness of any 
one particular individual in the group (for concrete proposals regarding how 
this  degree  is  determined,  see  Matushansky  and  Ruys  2006,  and  Scontras 
2008). Although we are not concerned here with the group reading of plural 
superlatives, it is worth noting that Observation 1 holds of that reading too. 
For  example,  The  Italian  students  and  the  French  students  are  the  best 
students, where the subject term refers to two groups, doesn’t entail that the 
property [ x: x is a group of singular individuals. the goodness of x exceeds 
the goodness of every other group of students except x] holds of the Italian 
students group and the French students group; only the property [ x: x is a 
group of singular individuals. the goodness of x exceeds the goodness of every 
other group of students except for the Italian group and the French group] 
does. And here, too, the context supplies a cut-off point which both the Italian 
students, as a group, and the French students, as a group, must exceed. 
The  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  an  analysis  of  the  individual 
reading of (1) that is compatible with Observations 1 and 2’. 
 
1.2.  Why Observation 1 is a Problem 
 
As shown by Stateva (2005), any semantics for -est which presupposes that 
the  external  argument  of  -est  is  a  member  of  the  contextually-supplied 
comparison set, coupled with the assumption that plural morphology indicates 
the presence of a VP-level distributive ‘*’-operator (see Link 1983, Landman 
1989, Schwarzschild 1996 and others), works well for singular superlatives, 
but yields for (1) the contradictory reading from Observation 1. We illustrate 
this point using Heim’s (1999) semantics, but the same point can be made for 
other proposals. 
  The  assumptions  in  (8)-(9),  regarding  the  interpretation  of  gradable 
adjectives and the superlative morpheme, yield for John is the tallest student, 
with a singular superlative, the interpretation in (10). 
 
(8)    a.  For  any  d  of  type  d  (degree)  and  any  singular  x  of  type  e 
(individual), [[tall]](d)(x) = True iff x’s tallness is at least d. 
    b.  Type shifting operation: [ R D<d,<e,t>>.  P D<e,t>.  d Dd.  x De. 
R(d)(x) and P(x)]. 
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    c.  [[tall  student]](d)(x)  =  True  iff  x  is  a  (singular)  student  and  x’s 
tallness is at least d (by combining tall and student via the type 
shifting operation in (8b)). 
 
(9)   For  any  R  of  type  <d,<e,t>>  and  any  x  (type  e),  [[-est]]
C(R)(x)  is 
defined only if: (i) x C, and (ii) for all y C: there is a degree d such 
that R(d)(y)=True.  
    Whenever defined, [[-est]]
C(R)(x)=True iff there is a d such that R(d)(x) 
= True and for all y x such that y C: R(d)(y) = False. 
 
(10)  Whenever defined (in particular, when all members of C are students 
who  are  tall  to  some  degree  and  John C),  [[ John  [(be)  [-est  [tall 
student]]] ]]
C = True iff John is taller than any y C such that y John. 
 
As for pluralization, let us adopt a simplified version of the view advocated in 
Schwarzschild 1996, according to which pluralities are non-singleton sets of 
singular  individuals  (and  for  any  singular  individual  x,  x={x};  see  Quine 
1969).  The  assumptions  in  (11b,c)  regarding  the  pluralization  of  1-place 
predicates such as left by the distributivity operator ‘*’ (which yield (11a) as 
the  interpretation  of  John  and  Bill  left),  coupled  with  the  assumptions 
regarding  the  interpretation  of  tall  and  -est  in  (8)  and  (9),  yield  the 
contradictory (12) as the interpretation of (1). 
 
(11)  a.  [[ [John and Bill] *left ]] = True iff John left and Bill left. 
    b.  For any set P, *P is the smallest set such that: 
    (i)  P *P, and 
    (ii) If a *P and b *P, then a b *P.     
      c.  If the characteristic set of [[left]] is {John, Bill, Mary}, then the 
characteristic  set  of  [[*left]]  is  {John,  Bill,  Mary,  {John,  Bill}, 
{John, Mary}, {Bill, Mary}, {John, Bill, Mary}}. 
 
(12)  Whenever defined (in particular, when all members of C are students 
with some degree of tallness and Bill   C and John   C), [[ John and 
Bill *[(be) [-est [tall student]]] ]]
C = True iff John is taller than any 
y C such that y John, and Bill is taller than any y C such that y Bill. 
 
The problem with the LF in (12), as noticed by Stateva, is that -est is in the 
scope of ‘*’, which leads to the attribution of ‘being tallest student’ to both 
members of the subject term.  
We may want to ask whether (13), where ‘*’ is not attached directly to 
the noun and is outside the scope of -est, is a viable alternative. 
 
(13)  [John and Bill [(be) [-est [tall *student]]]] 
 
Suppose we remove from (8a) the requirement that tall apply to singularities. 
If we then combine tall with *student via the type shifting operation in (8b), 
we get: [ d Dd.  x De. x is a singularity or a plurality of students and x is at 
least d-tall]. But what does it mean for a plurality to be tall to some degree? 
Within the framework outlined so far, predicates such as [tall *student] are not 
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defined.  Suppose,  for  the  sake  of  discussion,  that  we  stipulate  that  [tall 
*student] is true of a plural individual x and a degree d if and only if all 
singular members of x are at least d-tall. Since our semantics for -est in (9) 
doesn’t require its external argument to be a singularity, we get the following 
non-contradictory (and intuitively correct) truth conditions for (1). 
 
(14)  Whenever defined (in particular, when Bill   C and John   C), [[ John 
and Bill [-est [tall *student]] ]]
C = True iff the plurality {John, Bill} is 
taller than any other member of C. 
 
The distributivity problem is thus solved. 
  We come back to the LF in (13) in section 3 (where we look at several 
alternatives to our own proposal, outlined in section 2), and examine it in 
more detail. For the moment, it is sufficient to acknowledge that (12) leads to 
contradictory truth conditions, and that (13) requires a definition of degrees 
that renders predicates such as [tall *student] applicable to a plurality. 
  
1.3.  Why Observation 2’ is a Problem 
 
Even if we solve the distributivity problem using (13), obtaining the truth 
conditions in (14), the cut-off problem remains: if Mary is shorter than Bill 
and John, but taller than all the others, the prediction is that the truth of (1) 
entails the truth of John, Bill and Mary are the tallest students, which is at 
odds with Observation 2’. To solve the cut-off problem, one might be tempted 
to posit two superlative morphemes. Plural morphology, on this view, is a 
reflex of the plural superlative morpheme (and not of ‘*’).  
One  concrete  implementation  of  this  idea  states  that  the  singular 
superlative -est
SG has the semantics in (15) and that the plural superlative -est
PL 
has the semantics in (16) (where cut-off(C) is the cut-off degree supplied by 
C, and comp(C) is the comparison set supplied by C; cf. Herdan (2008)). -est
PL 
is inherently distributive. 
 
(15)  [[-est
SG]]
C(R)(x) is defined only when: (i) x is a singularity; (ii) x C, 
(iii) for all y C there is a degree d such that R(d)(y)=True. 
    Whenever defined, [[-est
PL]]
C(R)(x)=True iff there is a degree d such 
that R(d)(x) = True and for every y in C distinct from x, R(d)(y) = 
False. 
 
(16)  [[-est
PL]]
C(R)(X) is defined only when: (i) X is a plurality; (ii) X C, (iii) 
for all Y C: for all y Y there is a degree d such that R(d)(y)=True, 
and Y doesn’t overlap X. 
    Whenever  defined,  [[-est
PL]]
C(R)(X)=True  iff  for  every  x X,  R(cut-
off(C))(x) = True and for every Y (C – {X}), for every y Y, R(cut-
off(C))(y) = False. 
 
This yields (17) as the LF and interpretation for (1).  
 
(17)  Whenever defined, [[ John and Bill [-est
PL [tall student]] ]]
C = True iff 
John’s tallness is at least the cut-off point of C and Bill’s tallness is at 
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least the cut-off point of C (so Bill and John could be equally tall or 
not), but for all other x, the tallness of x is less than the cut-off of C. 
 
These are indeed the intuitive truth conditions, and from that perspective, the 
solution is viable. Notice that by solving the cut-of problem with the help of 
an inherently distributive -est
PL, the distributivity problem is also solved. Thus, 
we note that the two problems are not completely unrelated: it is true that one 
could imagine a state of affairs where Observation 1 holds but Observation 2’ 
does not (indeed, this is the state of affairs which Stateva describes), but one 
cannot imagine a state of affairs where the opposite is true.  
Interestingly,  the  two  problems  are  also  related  by  the  fact  that  no 
analysis that stipulates the existence of two distinct superlative morphemes 
(e.g., (15) and (16)) is supported by cross-linguistic morphological evidence. 
In  fact,  such  evidence  strongly  suggests  that  there  is  only  one  superlative 
morpheme. No language (that we are aware of) has two distinct lexical items 
corresponding to singular and plural superlatives. There are languages that 
make  a  singular/plural  distinction  morphologically,  but  in  those  languages 
plural morphology is always on the noun (and may “spread” by agreement, as 
in the Russian example in (18)); but it is never exclusively on the superlative 
morpheme. 
 
      Everest  i     K2 – samye    vysokije  gory 
            Everest and K2    most.pl.  high.pl    mountains.pl 
           ‘Everest and K2 are the highest mountains.’  
 
There  are  also  languages  that  have  more  than  one  superlative  morpheme. 
Japanese is a language that has two items corresponding to -est: ichiban and 
mottomo. The former is used with expressions denoting singular individuals 
and the latter is used with both (in fact, Toshiko Oda informs us that while 
ichiban is not completely unacceptable with plural expressions, mottomo is 
certainly preferred). This brings up the possibility that ichiban corresponds to 
(15), and mottomo to (9). 
 
(19)    a.  John-ga    ichiban   takai  yama-ni        mobotta 
    John-nom   most      high  mountain-to   climbed   
    ‘John climbed the highest mountain’ 
    b.  ??John-ga   ichiban   takai yamayama-ni     mobotta 
    John-nom   most      high  mountains-to      climbed   
    ‘John climbed the highest mountains’ 
    c.  John-ga   mottomo   takai yama-ni        mobotta 
    John-nom   most      high  mountain-to   climbed   
    ‘John climbed the highest mountain’ 
    d.  John-ga    mottomo   takai yamayama-ni    mobotta 
    John-nom   most  high   mountains-to       climbed 
  ‘John climbed the highest mountain’ 
 
The  point  is  that  even  Japanese  doesn’t  have  a  morpheme  that  is  used 
exclusively  with  expressions  that  denote  plural  individuals,  and  plural 
morphology  appears  on  the  noun,  as  in  English,  which  means  that  the 
problematic LF in (12) would still be generated. In addition, there is probably 
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an independent reason why ichiban usually doesn’t sound good with plural 
superlatives:  it  literally  means  “number  one”  (which  makes  ichiban  takai 
similar to the English the single highest, which also cannot be used with plural 
denoting nouns). 
  For this reason our proposal, which is outlined in the next section, does 
not posit two such lexical items. We begin by offering a semantics that solves 
the  distributivity  problem,  and  then  we  make  the  necessary  amendments 
required to solve the cut-off problem. 
 
 
2.  The Proposal 
 
We propose (21) – with ‘**’ on tall and ‘*’ on student – as an alternative to 
the problematic LF in (12) (repeated below as (20)). In (21) -est is neither in 
the scope of ‘*’ nor of ‘**’. 
 
(20)  [John and Bill *[-est [tall student]]] 
 
(21)  [John and Bill [-est [**tall *student]]] 
 
When  attached  to  verbs  that  denote  <e,<e,t>>-functions,  ‘**’  delivers 
functions  of  the  kind  shown  in  (22b,c,d),  which  are  meant  to  derive  the 
intuitive truth conditions of sentences such John and Bill love Mary and Sue 
(as in (22a); see Sternefeld 1998 and Beck 2001).  
 
(22)    a.   [[   [John and Bill] **love [Mary and Sue]  ]]  = True iff each member 
of {John, Bill} loves at least one member of {Mary, Sue}, and each 
member of {Mary, Sue} is loved by at least one member of {John, 
Bill}. 
      b.  For any relation R, **R is the smallest relation such that: 
(i)  R **R, and 
(ii) If <a,b> **R and <c,d> **R, then <a c, b d> **R 
      c.   If the characteristic set of [[love]] is {<John, Mary>, <Bill, Sue>}, 
then  the  characteristic  set  of  [[**love]]  is  {<John,  Mary>,  <Bill, 
Sue>,  <{John, Bill}, {Mary, Sue}>}. 
      d.   [[**love]](Y)(X) is defined only if: 
          Whenever there is a x X and a y Y such that [[love]](y)(x) = True, 
then for all x X there is a y Y such that [[love]](y)(x) = True, and 
for all y Y there is a x X such that [[love]](y)(x) = True. 
          Whenever defined, [[**love]](Y)(X) = True iff there is a x X and a 
y Y such that [[love]](y)(x) = True. 
 
Note that the definedness condition (i.e., presupposition) in (22d) is stated in 
the form of a conditional ‘if p, then q’. This means that for (22a) to be false, 
John must love neither Mary nor Sue and Bill must love neither Mary nor Sue. 
Positing  this  presupposition  is  supported  by  the  judgment  that  (23) 
appears to convey that neither John nor Bill loves either Mary or Sue (cf. Beck 
2001; see also Löbner 1987 and Schwarzschild 1994).  
 
(23)  John and Bill don’t love Mary and Sue. 
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If instead of (22) (with its presupposition), we had the semantics for **love in 
(24) (without this presupposition), we would not account for the intuitions 
regarding (23). 
 
(24)    [[**love]](Y)(X)  =  True  iff  for  all  x X  there  is  a  y Y  such  that 
[[love]](y)(x)  =  True,  and  for  all  y Y  there  is  a  x X  such  that 
[[love]](y)(x) = True. 
 
In other words, in a situation where Sue is loved by John and Bill but Mary is 
not loved by either of them, (23) would come out true, contrary to fact. 
We assume that ‘**’ may attach to expressions that denote <d,<e,t>>-
functions, in which case it delivers functions of the kind shown in (25).  
 
(25)  a.  If the characteristic set of [[tall]] is {<d1, John>, <d2, Bill>}, then 
the characteristic set of [[**tall]] is {<d1, John>, <d2, Bill>, <{d1, 
d2}, {John, Bill}>}. 
      b.   [[**tall]](D)(X) is defined only if: 
          Whenever there is a d D and a x X such that [[tall]](d)(x) = True, 
then for all d D there is a x X such that [[tall]](d)(x) = True and 
for all x X there is a d D such that [[tall]](d)(x) = True. 
          Whenever defined, [[**tall]](D)(X) = True iff there is a d D and a 
x X such that [[tall]](d)(x)= True. 
      c.   Whenever defined, [[**tall *student]](D)(X) = True iff there is a 
d D  and  a  x X  such  that  [[tall]](d)(x)=True  and 
[[student]](x)=True. 
 
In addition, we assume that -est has the semantics in (26), yielding for (1) an 
interpretation compatible with Observation 1. 
 
(26)  [[-est]]
C(R)(X) is defined only if: (i) X C, (ii) for all Y C such that 
Y X: Y doesn’t overlap X, and (iii) for all Y C: there is a (singularity 
or plurality of degrees) D such that R(D)(Y)=True.  
    Whenever  defined,  [[-est]]
C(R)(X)=True  iff  there  is  a  D  such  that 
R(D)(X) = True and for all Y X such that Y C: R(D)(Y) = False. 
 
Since X in (26) is not required to be a plurality – it can be either a singularity 
or a plurality – the semantics is good for both John is the tallest student and 
John and Bill are the tallest students. 
 
(27)  Whenever defined, [[ John [-est [tall student]] ]]
C = True iff there is a 
singular  degree  d  such  that  [[tall  student]](d)(x)  =  True  and  for  all 
y John, [[tall student]](d)(y) = False. 
 
(28)  Whenever defined, [[ John and Bill [-est [**tall *student]] ]]
C = True iff 
there  is  a  plurality  of  degrees  D  such  that  [[**tall 
*student]](D)({John,Bill}) = True and for all Y {John,Bill} such that 
Y C, [[**tall *student]](D)(Y) = False. 
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If instead of (25) (with its presupposition) we had the semantics in (29) 
for **tall (cf. (24)), we would incorrectly predict (1) (John and Bill are the 
tallest students, or its LF in (21)), to be true in the scenario in (30), as shown 
in (31). 
 
(29)    [[**tall]](D)(X)  =  True  iff  for  all  d D  there  is  a  x X  such  that 
[[tall]](d)(x)  =  True  and  for  all  x X  there  is  a  d D  such  that 
[[tall]](d)(x) = True. 
 
(30)  C = {{Bill, John}, {Fred, Ted}} 
  Bill is 6’, John is 5’, Fred is 5’10”, Ted is 5’4”. 
  
(31)   There is a plurality of degrees D (namely, {6’,5’}) such that [[**tall 
*student]](D)({John,Bill})  =  True  and  [[**tall 
*student]](D)({Fred,Ted}) = False. 
 
In  other  words,  the  presupposition  in  (25b)  guarantees  that  the  shortest 
member of the subject term is taller than everyone who is not a member of the 
subject term. Figures 1 and 2 on the next page further illustrate how (25b) 
yields the correct interpretation for (21). 
This  proposal  still  doesn’t  account  for  Observation  2’  (in  fact,  it 
predicts Stateva’s Observation 2, which we take to be wrong, to hold). We 
therefore  offer  (32)  as  the  semantics  for  -est  (C  is  a  pair  consisting  of  a 
comparison set – (Comp(C)) and a cut-off (which can be either a singularity or 
a plurality of degrees) – Cut-off(C)).  
 
(32)    [[-est]]
C(R)(X)  is  defined  only  if  (i)  X Comp(C),  (ii)  for  all 
Y Comp(C)  such  that  Y X:  Y  doesn’t  overlap  X,  and  (iii)  for  all 
Y Comp(C): there is a (singularity or plurality of degrees) D such that  
R(D)(Y) = True.  
      Whenever  defined,  [[-est]]
C(R)(X)  =  True  iff  R(Cut-off(C))(X)=True 
and for all Y such that Y Comp(C) and Y X, R(Cut-off(C))(Y) = 
False. 
 
(33)  Whenever defined, [[ John be [-est [tall student]] ]]
C = True iff John’s 
tallness is at least the cut-off of C and for every y C, y John: y’s 
tallness is less than this cut-off. 
 
(34)  Whenever defined, [[ John and Bill be [-est [**tall *student]] ]]
C = True 
iff John’s tallness is at least the cut-off of C and Bill’s tallness is at 
least the cut-off of C, but everyone else’s tallness is less than the cut-
off of C. 
 
The  only  interpretation  of  (33)  –  with  a  singular  superlative  expression  – 
which  would  make  its  utterance  felicitous  is  one  where  the  cut-off  is 
determined in a way that allows only one singular individual to have it. If the 
context doesn’t supply such a cut-off, the initial cut-off has to be readjusted to 
enable a felicitous utterance of the sentence. 
  A variation on this very same solution would be one where the cut-off 
is an argument of -est, and is represented by a degree-denoting pronominal 
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expression in the syntactic tree, as follows (with the necessary adjustments in 
the semantics of -est). 
 
(35)  [John and Bill [[-est proj] [**tall *student]]] 
 
And yet another variation would be one where proj denotes a number. This 
would be consistent with the fact that plural superlatives that include numbers 
(e.g., the tallest five students; see Scontras 2008 for discussion of these cases) 
force an interpretation where five students indeed meet the contextual cut-off 
(in the same way singular morphology, with or without an overt numerical 
expression, as in the (one/single) tallest student, forces an interpretation where 
only one student is above the cut-off.  
  In the next section we consider some advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative solutions to the distributivity problem. 
 
 
Figure 1: Relation between X and D under presupposition of ** (TRUE) 
 
 
Figure 2: Relation between D and X under presupposition of ** (FALSE) 
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3.  Alternative Solutions to the Distributivity Problem  
 
In this section we consider some alternatives to the semantics in (26), repeated 
below as (36), and to the LF in (21) (repeated below as (37)). 
 
(36)  [[-est]]
C(R)(X) is defined only if (i) X C, (ii) for all Y C such that 
Y X: Y doesn’t overlap X, and (iii) for all Y C: there is a (singularity 
or plurality of degrees) D such that R(D)(Y)=True.  
    Whenever  defined,  [[-est]]
C(R)(X)=True  iff  there  is  a  D  such  that 
R(D)(X) = True and for all Y X such that Y C: R(D)(Y) = False. 
 
(37)  [John and Bill [-est [**tall *student]]] 
 
Since,  as  we  saw  in  section  1.2,  the  distributivity  problem  can  be  solved 
independently of the cut-off problem, we largely ignore the cut-off problem 
for simplicity.  
 
3.1.  Singular Degrees; Plural Individuals 
 
One  possible  alternative  solution  to  the  problem  posed  by  (12)  (repeated 
below as (38)) was already mentioned in Section 1 (see (13)), and is repeated 
below as (39). 
 
(38)  [John and Bill *[-est [tall student]]] 
 
(39)  [John and Bill [-est [tall *student]]] 
 
As we noted in section 1, by adjusting the semantics of tall and combining tall 
with *student, we derive the function [ d Dd.  x De. x is a singularity or a 
plurality of students and x is at least d tall]. But we have to be more precise 
about what it means for a plurality to be tall to some (singular) degree d. 
Perhaps  we  can  stipulate  that  it  means  that  every  singular  member  of  the 
plurality is at least d-tall (while adding a presupposition similar to the one in 
(22d)).  
 
(40)   [[tall]](d)(X) is defined only if:  
    If there is a x X such that x’s tallness is at least d, then for every x X, 
x’s tallness is at least d. 
    Whenever defined, [[tall]](d)(X) = True iff for every x X: x’s tallness 
is at least d. 
 
Coupled with the semantics for -est in (41), this would yield the semantics in 
(42) for John is the tallest student and that in (43) for (1). 
 
(41)    [[-est]]
C(R)(X) is defined only if: (i) X C, (ii) for all Y C such that 
Y X: Y doesn’t overlap X, and (iii) for all Y C: there is a degree d 
such that R(d)(Y)=True.  
    Whenever  defined,  [[-est]]
C(R)(X)=True  iff  there  is  a  d  such  that 
R(d)(X)=True and for all Y such that Y C and Y X: R(d)(Y)=False. 
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(42)  Whenever defined, [[ John [-est [tall student]] ]] = True iff John is taller 
than everyone else. 
 
(43)  Whenever defined, [[ John and Bill [-est [tall *student]] ]] = True iff the 
shortest among {John, Bill} is taller than everyone else. 
 
This analysis mimics the predictions of our proposal in (25)-(26) regarding 
(1).  However,  unlike  the  presupposition  in  (25),  which  was  shown  to  be 
motivated independently as a general presupposition of ‘**’-predicates (see 
discussion  of  (22d)),  the  presupposition  in  (40)  is  not  independently 
motivated.  So  although  both  proposals  make  the  exact  same  predictions 
regarding (1), the proposal in (25)-(26) seems to us more explanatory, as it 
contains fewer stipulations.    
It is worth noting that that an analysis in the spirit of (40)-(41) may 
work well for ‘group’ plural superlatives (mentioned briefly in section 1.1). 
Still, the existence of group readings doesn’t obviate the need for a semantics 
of non-group – that is to say, absolute – readings of plural superlatives (and 
the proposal in (36)-(37) works just as well for group readings, once we have 
a procedure for mapping each group to the degree that “represents” it). 
The  remaining  alternatives  discussed  below  presuppose  that  tall  is 
interpreted as in (8a) (repeated below as (44)). 
 
(44)  For any singular degree d and any singularity x, [[tall]](d)(x) = True iff 
x’s tallness is at least d. 
 
3.2.  Plural Morphology in the Noun Phrase is not Interpreted 
 
Another possible alternative says that plural morphology in the noun phrase is 
not semantically interpreted; it is rather the result of a syntactic agreement 
mechanism between the subject and the predicate. According to this solution, 
the  superlative  morpheme  has  the  meaning  in  (45),  where  distributivity  is 
built-in. 
 
(45)  [[-est]]
C(R)(X)  is  defined  only  if  for  every  Y C  distinct  from  X,  Y 
doesn’t overlap X. Whenever defined, [[-est]]
C(R)(X)=True iff there is a 
degree d such that for every x X: R(d)(x) = True, and for every Y in C 
distinct from X and for every y Y: R(d)(y) = False. 
 
This will yield (46) and (47) as the LFs and interpretations of John is the 
tallest student and John and Bill are the tallest students. 
 
(46)  Whenever defined, [[  John [-est [tall student]] ]] = True iff John is taller 
than everyone else. 
 
(47)  Whenever defined, [[  John and Bill [-est [tall student]] ]] = True iff the 
shortest singular individual among {John, Bill} is taller than everyone 
else. 
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The problem with this solution is that plural morphology on nouns 
(and  adjectives)  does  have  a  semantic  effect,  as  shown  by  the  following 
identity  sentence.  At  least  one  of  the  definite  descriptions  has  to  contain 
semantic plurality (and if one of them does, there is no reason why the other 
shouldn’t). 
 
(48)  The tallest students are the smartest students. 
 
While  there  are  various  possible  mechanisms  for  interpreting  plural 
morphology in noun/determiner phrases (see, for example, Sauerland 2004, 
Ionin and Matushansky 2006), it is clear that (48) requires some mechanism 
that doesn’t completely ignore plural morphology in the noun phrase. 
 
3.3.  Degree-operator Movement (Stateva 2005)  
 
This solution was considered (and rejected) by Stateva. It offers (49) – where 
the superlative morpheme has scoped over ‘*’ – as an alternative to the LF in 
(12). This requires adjusting the semantics of -est as in, for example, (50).  
 
(49)  [John and Bill [-est  1 *[t1-tall student]]] 
 
(50)    [[-est]]
C(R)(X) is defined only if: (i) X C, (ii) for all y C such that 
y X: y is a singularity that doesn’t overlap X, and (iii) for all Y C: 
there is a degree d such that R(d)(Y)=True.  
    Whenever  defined,  [[-est]]
C(R)(X)=True  iff  there  is  a  d  such  that 
R(d)(X)=True and for all y such that y C and y x: R(d)(Y)=False. 
 
(51)  Whenever defined, [[John [-est [tall student]]]]
C = True iff John is taller 
than everyone else in C. 
 
(52)  Whenever defined, [[John and Bill [-est  1 *[t1-tall student]]]]
C = True 
iff there is a degree d such that [[ 1 *[t1-tall student]]]]
C({John,Bill}) = 
True,  and  for  all  y C  such  that  y X,  [[ 1  *[t1-tall  student]]]]
C(y)  = 
False. 
 
The solution delivers the right truth conditions for John and Bill are the tallest 
students: it requires that the shorter of John and Bill (or if they are both of 
equal height, that both John and Bill) be taller than any other relevant singular 
individual.  
The problem with this solution, as Stateva notes, is that usually, degree 
operators  cannot  scope  over  quantifiers  (a  generalization  referred  to  as 
Kennedy’s Generalization in Heim 2000; see Kennedy 1999). This is shown 
(see  Heim  2000)  by  the  fact  that  Every  student  is  less  than  5  feet  tall  is 
unambiguous.  
 
(53)    a.   [every student] [ 1 [less than 5 ft] [ 2 [t1 is t2-tall]]]             
      For every student x, x’s tallness is less than 5 feet.     
                  (attested) 
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    b.  [less than 5 ft] [ 1 [every student] [ 2 [t2 is t1-tall]]]             
      The maximal d such that for every student x, x is d-tall – is less 
than 5 feet. 
                  (not attested) 
 
(54)    For every P of type <d,t>, [[less than 5 ft ]](P) = True iff Max(P) < 5 ft. 
 
Not all quantifiers are subject to Kennedy’s Generalization (see Heim 2000), 
as shown by (55), which, on its split-scope reading, presumably has the LF in 
(56), which involves less-movement (but see Sharvit and Stateva 2002 for a 
way to derive the truth conditions without less-movement). 
 
(55)    John needs to climb a less high mountain than Bill (needs to climb). 
    Possible  reading:  John’s  mountain-climbing  achievement  needs  are 
less demanding than Bill’s mountain-climbing achievement needs. 
 
(56)    [less [ 1 [Bill needs to climb a t1-high mountain]]] [ 2 [John needs to 
climb a t2-high mountain]] 
 
(57)  [[less]](P)(P’) = True iff Max(P’) < Max(P) 
 
Stateva’s  point  is  that  ‘*’  IS  a  quantifier  that  must  respect  Kennedy’s 
Generalization, as evidenced by the lack of ambiguity of (58). 
 
(58)    Scott and Bill are less than 5 feet tall. 
a.  For every x, x {Scott,Bill}, x’s tallness is less than 5 feet.         
                (attested) 
 
b.  The maximal d such that for every x, x {Scott,Bill}, x is d-tall – is 
less than 5 feet.             
  
                (not attested)   
 
Therefore, this solution cannot be adopted either. 
 
3.4.  “Shrinking” C (Stateva 2005) 
 
The last alternative solution we consider is also due to Stateva (and it is the 
solution she ultimately adopts). The idea here is to remove from (9) (repeated 
below  as  (59))  the  presupposition  that  the  external  argument  of  -est  is  a 
member of C (see (60)). 
 
(59)  [[-est]]
C(R)(x) is defined only if (i) x C, and (ii) for all y C: there is a 
d such that R(d)(y)=True.  
    Whenever defined, [[-est]]
C(R)(x)=True iff there is a d such that R(d)(x) 
= True and for all y x such that y C: R(d)(y) = False. 
 
(60)   [[-est]]
C(R)(x) is defined only if for all y C: there is a degree d such 
that R(d)(y)=True.  
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      Whenever defined, [[-est]]
C(R)(x)=True iff there is a d such that R(d)(x) 
= True and for all y x such that y C: R(d)(y) = False. 
 
The semantics in (60) allows us to obtain from the LF in (12) (John and Bill  
*[-est [tall student]]), where ‘*’ has scope over -est, the interpretation “John is 
taller than any y C and Bill is taller than any y C, where C excludes both 
John and Bill”, in accordance with Observation 1.  
The problem with this solution is that ‘x C’ is indeed a presupposition 
of  -est.  It  is  hard  to  show  this  using  standard  presupposition  tests.  As  an 
illustration,  consider  von  Fintel’s  (2004)  Wait-a-Minute  test  which,  when 
applied to even, shows that even P(x) presupposes that P holds of someone 
and asserts that P holds of x. While (61b), which questions the truth of what 
Even  John  failed  the  exam  presupposes,  is  well-formed,  (61c),  which 
questions the truth of what the sentence asserts, is odd.  
 
(61)  a.  Even John failed the exam. 
b.  Wait a minute! I didn’t know someone failed the exam. 
c.  #Wait a minute! I didn’t know that John failed the exam. 
 
The test, however, is useless when it comes to determining the status of ‘x C’ 
with respect to -est. While (62b) is good, both (62c) and (62d) are odd, which 
means  that  the  test  singles  out  some  of  the  presuppositions  of  (62a) 
(specifically,  that  every  member  of  C  is  a  student  with  some  degree  of 
tallness), but not all of them (specifically, ‘John C’). 
 
(62)  a.  John is the tallest student. 
  b.  Wait a minute! I didn’t know John was a student. 
  c.  #Wait a minute! I didn’t know John was relevant/salient. 
  d.  #Wait a minute! I didn’t know John was the tallest student. 
 
The fact that standard presupposition tests are not applicable to inferences of 
this sort is not a problem for the theory of presuppositions (nor is it a problem 
for the claim that ‘x C’ is a presupposition of -est); it just means that we need 
other ways to determine the status of ‘x C’ with respect to -est. 
Luckily, we do have a way to determine that ‘x C’ is, at the very 
least, true whenever ‘x is R-est’ is true. Consider the intuitively contradictory 
(63a) interpreted relative to a C that excludes John and Bill (an option allowed 
by Stateva’s solution). The interpretation in (63b) is non-contradictory. 
 
(63)  a.  ##John is the tallest student and Bill is too. 
  b.  Whenever defined (e.g., C={Mary, Fred, Sally}), [[ John [-est [tall 
student]] and Bill [-est [tall student]] ]]
C = True iff John is taller 
than anyone in C and Bill is taller than anyone in C. 
 
To solve this problem, we may stipulate a pragmatic constraint (or procedure) 
according to which every minimal clause is interpreted relative to the largest C 
possible. What this means is that we first interpret John [-est [tall student]] 
relative  to  the  largest  C  possible  (which  includes  everyone),  and  then  we 
interpret  Bill  [-est  [tall  student]]  relative  to  the  largest  C  possible  (which, 
again, includes everyone), and we get a contraction, as desired. 
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However, if  the pragmatic requirement to interpret minimal clauses 
relative  to  the  largest  C  possible  always  holds,  the  tallest  students  in  an 
argument position should also be interpreted relative to the largest C possible. 
This means that in every context where John and Bill are taller than everyone 
else, the tallest students obligatorily refers to John and Bill, as shown in (64) 
(assume  that  the  presupposes  existence  of  a  unique  maximal  individual 
satisfying the relevant predicate). 
 
(64)  [[ the tallest students left ]]
C is defined iff [[left]]
C([[the]]
C([[ *[-est [tall 
student]] ]]
C)) is defined; i.e., only if there a plurality of individuals X 
such that: [[ *[-est [tall student]] ]]
C(X) = True, and for every plurality Y 
such that [[ *[-est [tall student]] ]]
C(Y) = True, Y X. 
  
  If C={Fred, Mary, Sally}, [[ [the tallest students] ]]
C = {John, Bill}. 
  If C={Mary, Sally}, [[ [the tallest students] ]]
C = {John, Bill, Mary}. 
 
The point is that in some contexts we may want the tallest students to refer to 
one or more shorter individuals. But according to the proposed procedure, we 
must choose the largest C that doesn’t lead to a contradiction. 
  Proponents  of  this  view  may  want  to  suggest  that  we  change  the 
requirement to interpret the superlative relative to the largest C possible, to the 
more specific “largest C permitted by the contextually supplied cut-off point.” 
But if we are admitting reference to a cut-off in the semantics of -est, we no 
longer  need  to  exclude  the  subject  term  from  C  (suggesting,  somewhat 
implausibly, that the members of the subject term are not contextually salient; 
on this, see Fitzgibbons 2007). 
We may attempt yet another way to predict the contradictory reading 
of (63a): let us say that sentences with superlatives are evaluated relative to a 
set C of contextually-salient individuals and a function F from individuals to 
sets  such  that  for  every  x,  F(x)  includes  every  member  of  C  but  x  (thus 
avoiding the strange implication that x is not salient). 
 
(65)  a.  Whenever defined, [[-est]]
F,C(R)(x) = True iff x is R-er than every 
singular individual which is a part of some individual in F(x). 
  b.  Whenever defined, [[John is the -est [tall student] and Bill is too]]
F,C 
= True is iff John is taller than any x F(John) and Bill is taller than 
any x F(Bill). 
 
But applying this semantics to [John and Bill *[-est [tall student]]] brings back 
the familiar contradiction from Observation 1. We therefore maintain that the 
semantics of -est is as in (59), which without any further stipulations correctly 
predicts (1) to be non-contradictory, and (63a) to be contradictory. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
We  proposed  a  unified  semantics  for  singular  and  (absolute)  plural 
superlatives,  which  relies  on:  (a)  an  independently  motivated  pluralization 
operation  of  <d,<e,t>>-predicates;  and  (b)  a  contextually  supplied  cut-off 
degree. The former solves the distributivity problem and the latter solves the 
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cut-off problem. We rejected some alternative solutions, including a solution 
involving two distinct superlative morphemes.   
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